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BOOK REVIEWS
TRIAL DIPLOMACY. By Alan E. Morrill. Chicago: Court Practice
Institute. 1973. Pp. xxiii, 280. $20.00
One cannot read this book without viewing it as a symp-
tom of the fact that legal education is fumbling at the cross-
roads. For this is a comprehensive textbook on trial technique,
which was issued originally in a soft cover for law students -
even though the subject is not a traditional subject of law
school study. Now, this hard cover edition has been issued for
practicing lawyers.
Thus, legal education has come almost full circle since the
apprentice system for qualifying lawyers started in colonial
times. Under that system, a young man "reading law" and
working in the office of a practicing attorney learned trial tech-
nique and procedure as he absorbed substantive law. Then
came the law professors, with the case system, who proceeded
to tell the legal world that teaching such mundane subjects as
trial technique to a law student was a mistake. Indeed, at the
American Bar Association meeting in 1921 it was successfully
insisted that, thereafter, only law school study could qualify an
applicant for admission to the Bar. Today, it is at least argua-
ble that that was an error, and that the apprentice system
should again be permitted as an alternative to law school study
in order to qualify for bar examination.
Specifically, in opposing the recommendations of the Spe-
cial Committee of the Section of Legal Education of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1921 that "every candidate for admis-
sion to the bar should give evidence of graduation from a law
school," Charles F. Carusi, of Washington, D.C., said in rugged
opposition:
I would say now that I protest in the name of 110,000,000
people against so reactionary, so narrow, so unfair a position
as says: "It matters not what your competency in every par-
ticular, if you did not acquire it in one of about half a dozen
great endowed universities, then, not prima facie, but conclu-
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sively, you are unfit to represent your fellow citizens or to
advise them upon their legal rights."'
Finally, a reaction did develop. In 1947 Judge Jerome
Frank took a hard whack at-the system of law school study in
his article, "A Plea for Lawyer-'Schools". 2 The article's theme
was that practice or apprenticeship should be combined with
the study of law. Here is what he said in part:
American legal education went badly wrong some seventy
years ago when it was seduced by a brilliant neurotic. I refer
to the well-known founder of the so-called case system, Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell. I call him a neurotic advisedly.
He was a cloistered, bookish man, and bookish, too, in a
narrow sense. In his student days at Harvard Law School, he
haunted the library, poring over the Year Books; he is said
to have expressed regrets that he had not lived in the time of
the Plantagenets. In his sixteen years of practice he led a
secluded life, seeing little of clients, for the most part in the
law library writing briefs and drafting pleadings for other
lawyers. One of his biographers says of that period, "In the
most inaccessible retirement of his office, in the library of the
Law Institute, he did the greater part of his work. He went
little into company." Returned to Harvard as a law teacher,
there soon to become Dean, he is said to have referred to "a
comparatively recent case decided by Lord Hardwicke."
[Reviewer's note: Lord Hardwicke lived from 1690 to 1764].
His pedagogical theory reflected the man. The experience of
the lawyer in his office, with clients, and in the court-room
with judges and juries, were, to Langdell, improper materials
for the teacher and his student. They must, he insisted, shut
their eyes to such data. They must devote themselves exclu-
sively to what was discoverable in the library. The essence of
his teaching philosophy he expressed thus: "First that law is
a science; second, that all the available materials of that
science are contained in printed books." This second proposi-
tion, it is said, was "intended to exclude the traditional
methods of learning law by work in a lawyer's office, or atten-
dance upon the proceedings of courts of justice.
13
Judge Frank also described how different American legal
1 46 REPORTS OF THE A.B.A. 663 (1921).
2 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947).
Id. at 1303-04.
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education had been under the apprentice system when he said:
The history of American legal education commenced with the
apprentice system: The prospective lawyer "read law" in the
office of a practicing lawyer. Daily he saw for himself what
courts and lawyers were doing. Before his eyes, legal theories
received constant tests in legal practice. Even if he did not
always articulate the discrepancies between theory and prac-
tice, he felt them. The first American law school, founded by
Judge Reeves in the 1780's, was merely the apprentice system
on a group basis. The students were still in intimate daily
contact with the courts and law offices.
To shorten a long story, legal apprenticeship, a la Reeves or
otherwise, all but disappeared in the universities under the
impact of Langdellism, as school after school quarantined its
students in the library.'
In more recent years, the old case system of Dean Lang-
dell, based entirely on books, has come under increasing at-
tack. Clinical education on trial technique now has its head in
the tent of law school study in many of the nation's leading law
schools-including Harvard.' And the American Bar Associa-
tion has only recently affirmed standards for legal education
which not merely permit but affirmatively require the learning
of advocacy skills in law school.
What are the reasons for this? It is hard for a practicing
lawyer to say with certainty. But several things appear to be
clear. First is the fact that now many law students appear to
be bored with ordinary law school study,7 particularly after the
first year. And when students are bored-watch out! Undoubt-
edly, one reason they are bored is because, after four years of
college, most of them are eager to come to grips with the practi-
cal world. Three years of law school study in the Langdell sys-
tem do not appear to enable them to do so. Such study appears
to be so theoretically repetitive that students become restless
with it.
Id. at 1312.
Moulton, Clinical Education: As Much Theory as Practice, 24 HARv. L.S. BULL.
16 (1972).
1 1973 Standards for the Approval of Law Schools of the American Bar Associa-
tion § 302.
1 Legal Education: The HLS Community Speaks Out, 24 HARv. L.S. BULL. 12, 14
(1973).
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Second, law school courses well could be presented in a
more interesting fashion. A law school professor should not be
allowed, by virtue of scholarship, to become indifferent to the
technique of presentation. This reviewer lectures at various
universities on legal subjects and under a system whereby each
student has a chance to grade him. Some of the students' com-
ments can be brutally to the point, and many lecturers under
this system have learned a good deal about improving their
technique of presentation.
Third, perhaps, is the fact that while no law student at-
tempts to cover the entire area of law, he may study more
subjects under the case system than appear to be worth the use
of that method. Is three years of law school study necessary?
In any event, a recent wave of harsh criticism has been
directed at legal education for its failure to teach practical
skills. To use Chief Justice Burger's phrase, voiced at the Lon-
don portion of the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, legal education today fails to teach "basic training
and skills in advocacy." Many other writers have said the same
thing. Stanley Balbach raised this and many-other questions
in a comprehensive article entitled "Legal Education-The
Lawyers' Responsibility."' In another article, "Clinical Legal
Education: A Growing Reform," 9 Marvin J. Anderson and Guy
0. Kornblum insisted that law schools were getting better be-
cause programs with clinical education are now being under-
taken, and because in many states students can work in a law
office for considerable periods during the year of study. This is
particularly true of the School of Law of Northeastern Univer-
sity, as Thomas J. O'Toole, Dean of The Law School of North-
eastern University in Boston, articulates in "Realistic Legal
Education".10
Unquestionably, these signs, and the appearance of the
book under review, indicate that clinical education on such
things as trial technique is back in the law school to stay.
Accordingly, we may fairly ask the next question-why not
permit a return to the apprentice system as an alternative to
8 58 A.B.A.J. 600 (1972).
' 57 A.B.A.J. 591 (1971).
10 54 A.B.A.J. 774 (1968). See also vom Baur, Revitalizing the Trial Bar, 55
A.B.A.J. 138 (1969).
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law school study? Why should the apprentice system still be
prohibited? For now the law schools are in retreat from the old
case system; they are now trying to teach some of the things
which the apprentice system taught more effectively. And in
order to try to teach clinical education, they are eliminating
traditional subjects of law school study which were undoubt-
edly dear to the heart of Dean Langdell.
Let us not forget that the apprentice system turned out
many tremendously able lawyers. Moreover, it should be noted
that most criticism of that system, such as that asserted in 1921
at the American Bar meeting, was stated in very general terms
only;" specific criticisms invariably have been lacking. There
appears to be every reason to give the apprentice system an-
other chance.
In any event, this reviewer has a suggestion: Part of the
problem of many a law student is that he is not oriented to the
legal world when he lands in a law school's cloistered halls. If
he comes from a family of lawyers, or has worked as a clerk or
otherwise in a law firm during a summer, he has a very great
advantage over a student who comes from a family of engineers
or artists, knowing nothing at all about the legal world. What
better orientation could a potential law student have than a
one or two-year apprenticeship in law office study? By being
able to focus on problems and the challenges of the practical
legal world, he would also necessarily acquire a vivid interest
in legal theory. And a period of apprenticeship in a law office
would endow the neophyte entering law school for a final year
or two with a good deal of legal maturity, and perhaps find him
ready to tear into the curriculum. Moreover, students with a
background of practice might make the class more interesting
and diminish the feeling of boredom.
This sort of approach would not enable law school study
to cover every field of law in a one-year or two-year course. But
then, neither do present curricula. Nearly every law graduate
takes some kind of a cram course before he takes a bar exami-
nation, and in the process he finds himself studying a variety
of subjects that he never took in law school. Then, after getting
admitted to the bar, he may find himself plunged into subjects
like international law that were never covered in either law
" See 1921 A.B.A. REPORTS 656, 661-62, 673-74.
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school or bar exam preparation. Indeed, a lawyer's main educa-
tion and development certainly take place, not before law
school graduation, but afterward.
Now, what about the contents of Trial Diplomacy? The
author, Mr. Morrill, is executive director of the Court Practice
Institute, a nonprofit corporation. The book has impressive
credentials. It is used in the National Institute for Trial Advo-
cacy, an organization sponsored by the American Bar Associa-
tion, the Americai Bar Endowment, the American College of
Trial Lawyers, and the American Trial Lawyers Association. It
is said to be the most popular work in this area since Gold-
stein's Trial Technique.
Within its scope, it is a good and comprehensive book.
However, virtually all of the situations covered come from per-
sonal injury cases and a few criminal trials. Nevertheless, these
trial situations are covered with a clarity and such a high de-
gree of articulation that they are readily understandable. In
addition, the author has a keen sense of psychology and the
dramatic, and a broad imagination which is certainly one key
to the practical problems of trial work. Further, as with Spell-
man's much older How to Prove a Prima Facie Case, there are
many good question-and-answer examples for methods of proof
in specific situations.
Moreover, the book has an overall sense of trial organiza-
tion, in that the author views a trial as a single, overall project
which must be handled in terms of organization and manage-
ment from the very moment the client walks into the office
until the last appeal has been exhausted. As a result, there are
constant practical suggestions for tying the pieces together as
the trial process goes along, writing letters of instruction to
clients, keeping a trial notebook and a trial manual, and inte-
grating the threads of evidence into a closing argument.
One noteworthy feature of the book is that it contains so
much material in concentrated form that any study in depth
by a law student without courtroom experience would necessar-
ily take a fair aniount of time. Indeed, many lawyers constantly
engaged in trial work usually spend a fair number of years
exclusively in that activity before they learn this subject as
thoroughly as the author articulates it.
However, as stated above, the book does not go much be-
yond personal injury work. The author is the head of a law firm
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in Chicago, apparently engaged mainly in that type of practice.
There is no effort to cover trials in contract or commerical
litigation. As a result, the law student using this book will
undoubtedly emerge from the course thinking that all there is
to trial work in this country is personal injury work, with a dash
of criminal law thrown in.
As with any book, Trial Diplomacy is not reliable in every
respect. The author's description of the difference between
materiality and relevance-always a sticky subject-must
have Professor Wigmore twisting uneasily in his grave. And in
the bibliography under "Trial Practice" we have Carlos Israel's
book Corporate Practice thrown in along with How to Try a
Drunk Driving Case. How Corporate Practice ever got into this
list of books on trial technique remains a puzzle. Such failings
aside, Morrill's book remains a thorough treatment of trial
techniques that should help to shift the emphasis of legal edu-
cation back to the practice of law.
F. Trowbridge vom Baur*
*Admitted to the New York bar, 1934; D. C. Bar, 1948 and Illinois Bar, 1952;
associated with the firm of Milbank, Tweed and Hope, New York City, 1933-1942;
Regional Counsel, Office of the Coordinator, Inter-American Affairs, Central America
and Panama, 1942-1946; General Counsel of the Department of the Navy, 1953-1960;
Member of vom Baur, Coburn, Simmons & Turtle, and predecessor firms, 1960 to
present; Member of the American Bar Association (Member of the House of Delegates,
1957; Council Member, Administrative Law Section, 1955-57; Chairman, Standing
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 1958-1962; Chairman, Section of
Public Contract Law, American Bar Association, 1970-1971); Member of the Federal
Bar Association (President, D. C. Chapter, 1954-1955; Chairman, Administrative Law
Committee. 1953-1958); Member, American Law Institute.
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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST. By Milton Handler. New
York, New York: Matthew Bender, 1973.
The task of speaking to Professor Milton Handler's collec-
tion of essays and speeches, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust, is
one to be approached with a good deal of trepidation. Professor
Handler long ago established himself as an authoritative com-
mentator on the antitrust laws, and there can be no question
but that his speeches and essays have constituted a very impor-
tant contribution to the literature of the field. One need only
sample the book to move very quickly and confidently to the
conclusion that the book is important and of undoubted merit.
What then remains to the reviewer? A number of justifica-
tions can be raised for commentary, notwithstanding a com-
mendatory conclusion being reached in the first paragraph. A
potential reader might wish the advice of a past reader with
respect to the question of what one can expect from the book
and how one can use the book most efficiently, or one might
wish to have the assistance of a co-reader in evaluating the
truth of the statements made by the author. This review is
intended to achieve a rather modest goal - to comment briefly
on the book in terms of format and style, and to note the
existence of certain themes which might be overlooked by the
reader who reads only one or two of the essays.
The book itself is comprised of two volumes which include
1276 pages of text, a list of published and unpublished works
by Professor Handler (totalling an impressive 146), a table of
cases filling 89 pages and an index of 57 pages. These volumes
contain not only the Antitrust Development Lectures numbers
4 (1951) and 7-25 (1954-1972), but also a number of other
speeches and articles spanning Milton Handler's career, rang-
ing from "False and Misleading Advertising" (1929) to "Labor
and Antitrust: A Bit of History" (1971). The case and subject
indices seem comprehensive and should contribute mightily to
the utility of the work. Too often otherwise useful works are
hamstrung because indexing has been neglected; this collection
seems not to suffer from that deficiency and so the substantive
information the book makes available is complemented by the
indexing mechanism for access to the information.
The analytic content of the essays will prove most helpful
to students of antitrust law. To say that the law in this area is
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a complicated business is to understate the obvious, and all of
us need every bit of help available in attempting to work with
the tangled skein formed by eighty-five years of antitrust opin-
ions. The two volumes contain a wealth of information about
antitrust decisions of the last two decades, including citations
to relevant cases, statements relating to the records in cases
where the appellate opinions would normally provide the only
raw material, references to other scholarly works, and perhaps
most significantly, opinions as to what inferences might justifi-
ably be drawn based on the judicial opinions discussed.
The essays should prove useful to present and future com-
mentators, as well as those who are dipping their feet into the
cold waters of antitrust for the first time. The first essay in
Volume 1, "The Judicial Architects of the Rule of Reason", is
a masterful account of the maturation of the "Rule of Reason".
It is an economical presentation of material, the synthesis of
which would otherwise require massive commitments of time
and energy. The essay in many ways exemplifies the enduring
quality of Handler's essays. He is committed to the importance
of examining trends in the law-both short-range movements
that may be likened to short-lived phenomena (i.e., tropical
storms), and long-range movements that are glacial in scope
and impact. The Developments Lectures in general represent
a sound balance between the presentation of current cases, the
setting of those cases in the context of historical development,
and the extrapolation of the thrust of the cases into the future.
It is that balance which allows essays written twenty or more
years ago to be of interest to today's reader.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that Handler has
examined the field with the detachment of a historian search-
ing for patterns in some musty archive, however. The advocate
is ever present. One of the author's most consistent themes is
his skepticism as to the desirability of abandoning full-blown
inquiry into anticompetitive effect based on all relevant evi-
dence, in favor of decisions based on more limited inquiries. In
discussing the extent to which reciprocal dealing can be consid-
ered to be anticompetitive and in violation of antitrust laws,
Handler reveals his critical viewpoint:
Establishing the existence of a reciprocity agreement is,
in any event, not a sufficient ground upon which to predicate
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a section 1 violation, since the contract in question must also
be shown to restrain trade unreasonably. The rules of per se
illegality that the courts have applied to tying arrangements
may not be necessarily and invariably appropriate in the reci-
procity area.
Tie-ins can fairly be described as invariably coercive
Reciprocity, on the other hand, is not invariably coer-
cive. Of course, a company that is a major customer of an-
other nay use its monopsony position to force its supplier to
buy unwanted goods. But a reciprocal dealing arrangement
may also be entered into voluntarily since, unlike a tie-in, it
may well be of advantage to both parties. Although even non-
coercive reciprocity may sometimes have anticompetitive ef-
fects, does it really make sense, in the absence of coercive use
of leverage, to subject such arrangements to a per se rule?'
More complete exposure of that cast of mind is found in
Handler's discussions of the concept of "quantitive substan-
tiality" as it arose in Standard Oil Co. v. United States2 and
was restricted in Tampa Electric Co. v.'Nashville Coal Co. ,' in
his discussion of per se illegality and United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc.,' and in a number of other references and com-
ments scattered throughout both volumes.
We all must agree that decisions in antitrust are multi-
factor decisions. Those who favor the increased application of
per se standards are convinced that the net benefits accruing
from the use of a limited number of factors are greater than the
net benefits of attempting to consider all of the relevant evi-
dence. This writer has not yet formed an opinion as to whether
or not the enforcers of antitrust have too willingly embraced per
se rules of illegality, or objective, simplistic generalizations
about anticompetitive effect, or market definition. It is impor-
tant, though, that readers of the essays should be aware of
Handler's bias on this theme. The existence of the bias itself
is difficult to document by quotation from the book since it
exists primarily as a flavor, an overtone, an aura. And it is
' M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 990 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
HANDLER].
2 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
3 365 U.S. 320 (1961). See HANDLER at 408 et seq.
405 U.S. 596 (1972). See HANDLER at 998 et seq.
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apparent not so much in what is said, as in what is not said.
Handler's error, if it can be called that, lies primarily in a
failure to put forward the strongest of the arguments of those
with whom he might disagree as to conclusions.
The case for a full and complete hearing of all relevant
facts prior to decision is made many times, and made persu-
asively. But the countervailing considerations are not mar-
shalled with equivalent vigor. A brief catalog of these consider-
ations might include the following. First, the benefit to busi-
nessmen of relatively clear and objective standards against
which their behavior will be evaluated is unquestioned - for
increases in certainty in this area pay real dividends in terms
of facilitating planning and evaluating possible courses of ac-
tion. Next, clarity and simplicity also facilitate consistency of
administration. It has long been a defect in the system of ad-
ministering our laws that with changes in personnel in
administrative agencies, the public, and especially that part of
the public directly regulated, must speculate not only about
where the enforcement emphasis may fall, but also must at-
tempt to guess about what the new enforcer thinks the law
means. The business communities that are subject to regula-
tion are entitled to continuity of enforcement behavior and
consistenicy of interpretation; use of objective standards makes
continuity and consistency more likely. Finally, the more clear
and simple the standard, the greater the possibility of avoiding
complex and costly litigation with respect to the intricate fact
situations which seem inevitably to be present in antitrust dis-
putes. The omission of thorough discussion of these counter-
vailing interests seemed, to me, one of the book's few weak-
nesses.
Other themes appear in reading the essays. Handler's frus-
tration with the Robinson-Patman Act is apparent. His opinion
seems to be that the Commission has-not only made hash of
the statute in some cases, but that it seems bent on increasing
the breadth of the statute rather than vigorously enforcing the
statute against "hard core" violators who were the real objects
of the statute's prohibitions. 5 This is not a problem unique to
the FTC. Many administrative agencies on the federal level
I See HANDLER at 431.
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seem enamored of a policy of expanding their doctrinal juris-
diction and power at the expense, perhaps, of vigorous enforce-
ment of accepted principles, which latter course might be more
in the public interest.
It would be nice if one could, by quotation, demonstrate
lucidity of style; the difficulty is that writing which is clear and
concise is often disarmingly plain, and seemingly unexcep-
tional-which is, of course, its virtue. No talent is more needed
in antitrust than to make the complicated comprehensible
while avoiding the sacrifice of accuracy by resort to generaliza-
tion and approximation. The quotation which follows is repre-
sentative of the directness of Handler's style and illustrative of
his unhappiness with the opinions of the Supreme Court as
they relate to the issue of market definition. Once again we are
reminded of Handler's respect for comprehensive fact assess-
ment.
Markets are not theoretical abstractions - they are eco-
nomic realities. There is nothing esoteric about ascertaining
the proper boundaries of a market for,after all, a market for
antitrust purposes is the area of effective competition. No one
today disputes the fact that there can be submarkets within
broader market categories. From a product point of view, the
area of effective competition may include other separate and
disparate products which vie for the public's patronage. The
test here is whether there is a high degree of cross-elasticity
of demand. The fact that a product properly belongs within
a broader market does not necessarily mean that its own
characteristics and uses may not properly define the metes
and bounds of a submarket. By the same token, the differ-
ences in physical characteristics and uses need not compel
the conclusion that there is a submarket. There can be no pat
rules. The facts must reign supreme, and there is no escape
from a case-by-case determination.'
No review of Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust would be
complete without also alerting readers to the lighter side of the
book. The most sustained bit of humor in the collection is an
imaginary opinion in the case of the United States v. Joe's
Delicatessen.7 The result reached by Justice Christopher Co-
HANDLER at 1050.
T HANDLER at 546.
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lumbus Brown is to order divestiture by Joe's Delicatessen,
"ITihe second largest food establishment at the intersection
of K and 21st Streets, N.W. Washington, D.C.", of the assets
of Victor's Meat Market Co., "the third largest food store at
this intersection." The opinion contains all of the necessary
incantation of findings as to such matters as relevant market
and exhibits a wealth of case citation. The result is a very
funny bit of work which, like all good satire, is not without its
sting; we are reminded implicitly the verbal formulas are no
substitute for judgment, and that legal analysis may disguise
the suspension of common sense. Interestingly enough, Han-
dler himself, in commenting on our merger jurisprudence
nearly a decade later, comments that:
My fictitious opinion in Joe's Delicatessen was intended
as a fun piece, but the joke was really on me, since Joe's
Delicatessen turned out to be the precursor of Von's Grocery
and Pabst.'
Those more knowledgeable about antitrust jurisprudence
than this reviewer might perhaps have more to contribute in
terms of substantive criticism of Professor Handler's positions;
even those who disagree with him at times, however, must
acknowledge the magnitude of his contribution, and surely
would agree that the publication of these essays is a boon to
all those interested in antitrust.
John A. Kidwell*
HANDLER at 1053.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. 1967, Uni-
versity of Iowa; J.D. 1970, Harvard University.
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PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME. By Seymour L. Hal-
leck, M.D. University of California Press, 1971. Pp. XIV, 382.
Dr. Halleck is an accomplished psychiatrist who presents
in Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime a broad and thought-
ful critique of the law's treatment of those mentally disturbed
persons thought to have committed criminal acts. Acknowl-
edged upon its original publication in hard cover as being
"[b]y far the best general and popularly presented synthesis
of the psychiatric view of criminal behavior,"' this book in its
present paperback edition has lost little of its value as a lay-
man's introduction to the ethos of forensic psychiatry. Theories
of crime as diverse as endocrine abnormality and differential
association are presented and evaluated. A theory of crime as
adaption by an organism to perceived oppression, both real and
imagined, is advanced and defended. The position of the psy-
chiatrist in various legal settings is critically explored with
emphasis on ethical resolution of the conflicting roles of pa-
tient's doctor and prisoner's gaoler. The broad outlines of cer-
tain reforms are presented, and extensive footnotes throughout
the work provide further material on the topics covered.
The author of this excellent work is a healer of injured and
suffering men. His perception of crime's dilemmas and their
resolutions arises directly from that position. He dissents from
the view assigning criminal liability to the sane only, finding
the mens rea principles involved in the insanity defense rooted
in an unacceptable ethic of cruel and vengeful punishment. He
deems psychiatry's proper role to be that of physician to those
committed to its care rather than oracle on unanswerable ques-
tions of free will and moral responsibility. He argues that a
humane penal code should be prescinded from questions of
personal guilt and responsibility, instead incriminating pri-
marily on the basis of the commission of a prohibited act,2 with
the choice of consequent reformative treatment heavily influ-
enced by psychiatric considerations. Dr. Halleck's sensitive
criticisms cause one to pause to consider if indeed the law is
Brooke, Book Review, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 795, 796 (1967).
2 Innocent intent founded on mistake or supposed justification would remain a
defense. See S. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 341 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as HALLECK].
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only a slaughterer, occasionally provoked to mercy, or whether
defensible ideals may undergird its prescriptions and justify
present-day demands for psychiatric testimony on the issue of
responsibility.
Law promotes public aims by establishing formal and rec-
ognized rules governing social relationships such that the task
of achieving thosd aims may be accomplished. Of upmost im-
portance is the general observance of certain minimal stan-
dards basic to any organized society, e.g., refraining from un-
justified attack on individual personality and its accepted ex-
tensions such as property. The means for securing such observ-
ance are varied and include the enactment of penal law with
its formal system for passing judgment on the conformity of the
acts of individuals to the required norms .3 As presently devised,
the consequences of an adverse criminal judgment are the im-
position of detriments which satisfy society's instinctive urge
that "justice be done" and serve the rational goals of incapaci-
tation, deterrence and reinforcement of social mores both in the
offender and, more importantly, in society in general.
The cruelty especially apparent in this detriment phase
appalls Dr. Halleck and causes his concern with the correc-
tional rather than with the adjudicative process. This, together
with his scientific scepticism on the philosophic question of free
will, leads him away from questions of personal guilt in the
legal process and toward an emphasis of the actus reus of crime
rather than the mens rea.
If the penal system were truly free of influence by consider-
ations other than the particular harm caused, there would be
little argument with Dr. Halleck's position; homicide, whether
by madmen or by hired assassins, is equally threatening to
society. Yet there are other influences at work here for society
has, at least partially, answered Dr. Halleck's unanswerable
question of human responsibility. Man is viewed as a free agent
able to act as he chooses.' He owes an obligation either to his
3 Law is not regarded as the flower of science, to the disparagment of other disci-
plines. It is recognized that society aspires to something more than this minimal
civility and that maintenance of even this rather rude level of behavior is not solely or
even primarily due to the existence of penal law.
Eclectic scholars uncertain of the will's freedom may still conclude it more
desirable to proceed as if free will existed. See HALLECK 208, 211; H. PACKER, THE
Limrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION, 74-75 (1968).
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fellows or to a diety to choose conduct which conforms either
to ethical norms of social intercourse or to divine law. This
obligation may be, and often is, shirked, but it is the struggle
not to do so which lends dignity to the individual and forces
society to accord him autonomy to work out his own virtue or
salvation as he sees it.
As the legal world presently exists, freedom of will is uni-
versally acknowledged by law-giving bodies and is reflected in
the penal code's concern with personal guilt and its insistence
on mens rea as a necessary element of criminality. Free will is
obviously central to retributive theories of jurisprudence and of
considerable aid to utilitarian theories by providing a mecha-
nism by which individual conduct may be influenced.
Yet, one may join Dr. Halleck and propose a world in
which free will may or may not exist but does not find reflection
in penal law. Rather, ethical evaluation is left to other forums
and penal proscription is concerned only with the social harm
per se; the intellectual processes that caused the harm are de-
terminative only of the means employed to prevent recurrence.
Thus homicide through paranoia, intoxication, or greed would
be equally incriminating, but the reformative regimen imposed
would differ radically. To appraise this theory one must con-
sider why society presently imposes ethically implicative detri-
ments on those willfully violating its proscriptions that are
more onerous than those ethically neutral detriments imposed
for similar non-willful violations.
Retributive jurisprudence would note that the affrontery
present in the willful flouting of social values is absent where
the will fails to appreciate and act upon those values. A utili-
tarian analysis, once positing the existence and significance of
free will, would first note that the core of penal law concerns
such harms as homicide and theft, the ethical evaluation of
which is sufficiently simple' that a generally agreed-upon ethi-
cal judgment may be expected. Secondly, a given act may not
5 When complications become severe, doctrines such as necessity must be elabo-
rated (see, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.02) or the effort to penalize abandoned.
I The author believes that in the simple concerns of penal law a "correct" ethical
judgment may be at least approached by society. The law should not venture where
such is not the case for it is effrontery there to claim competence to attaint the
judgment of one's fellows. With those finding this last always to be the case, one may
only disagree and argue the utility developed from proceeding as if ethically valid
judgments may be objectively made by social institutions.
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be evaluated ds social harm or good without examination of the
mental processes producing the act. For example, homicide
may or may not have utility depending upon whether it is
assassination or execution; and mistake in the circumstances
surrounding the act may or may not provide utility through
reasonable excuse. Since the same evidence of act and mental
state are sufficient for the aforementioned general ethical judg-
ment, the criminal court may receive that judgment for the
asking.
The question then becomes whether there is utility in in-
cluding this answer as a part of the penal system. A danger of
great disutility is obviously present if the penal and ethical
forums arrive at different conclusions concerning the same
event. Ethics being a peculiarly personal matter, when the law
takes unto itself a mantle of morality and condemns an act
which the people find unblameworthy, the reaction apt to be
felt is a lessened respect for law in general, not merely for the
particular proscription in question. This counsels a prudent
restriction of penal sanction to the truly serious and opprob-
rious harms which are at its core. If this danger is avoided, the
inclusion of ethical evaluation in penal judgment will increase
the effectiveness of measures of coercive deterrence and affirm-
ative education used to influence individual conduct. Coer-
cively, insofar as one fears pangs of conscience and the ethical
condemnation of his fellows, there is provided a deterrence of
a kind not furnished by material and motorial deprivation
alone. Educatively, insofar as one may be taught and guided
by his fellows, his view of what he ought to be doing will be
changed or reinforced. This last is a most powerful tool to re-
duce the incidence of social harms, i.e., robbery is more cer-
tainly avoided if one believes he should not rob, rather than he
must not rob. No educative effect is possible from incriminat-
ing one who cannot understand and act upon socially espoused
ethical norms. The increased deterrence 7 and incapacitation
provided by criminal rather than civil treatment of this small
group of mentally incompetent people is outweighed by the
Few insane men commit crimes in the presence of uniformed police. Consider
the charge given to the jury in King v. Creighton, 14 Can. Crim. Cas. 349 (High Ct. of
Justice, Ont. 1908): "If you cannot resist an impulse in any other way, we will hang a
rope in front of your eyes, and perhaps that will help."
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weakening in the overwhelming majority of penal law's deter-
rent and educative effects occasioned by their observation of
equal incrimination for the ethically culpable and innocent
alike.
These reasons seem ample to justify the special treatment
prescribed for willful violation of the law. While this special
treatment usually is adverted to with reference to incrimina-
tion of those who have wrongfully chosen to engage in pro-
scribed conduct, it is equally administered in the exculpation
of those whose mental processes are so abnormal as to extin-
guish their duty to choose right conduct. It is in the elaboration
of this exculpation that much of the boundary of inculpation
has been defined. Any refusal of further elaboration would
inevitably affect incrimination and the social principles upon
which it is founded. In an individual case, society is equally
served by either answer to the question of a particular defen-
dant's responsibility, but it has an interest in assuring that the
question is asked and an answer given in terms of the reference
it has established. Through its special knowledge of the human
psyche, psychiatry may contribute to this determination. So-
ciety may justly call upon psychiatry to impart too the trial jury
that part of its evidence deemed material by society regardless
of the discomfort psychiatrists may experience at entering a
world of responsibility they find at best irrelevant.
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